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DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM MODEL FOR KEY MANAGEMENT 
 
Aripov M.M., Alaev R.H. 
 
Key management plays a crucial role in cryptography, as the basis for secure information exchange, data 
identification and integrity. There are software and hardware key management tools that support Crypto APIs and 
Cryptography Next Generation APIs(CNG API), Public Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS). These tools store 
cryptographic keys on hard disks, smart cards, tokens, and in other storage media. To use the cryptographic keys 
stored on these smart cards and tokens, you need to connect them to the appropriate hardware. The cryptographic 
keys stored on the hard drives of a computer or a laptop are used by the programs of these devices. If it becomes 
necessary to use a single key in different systems, then you will have to create copies of the key on all these devices. 
This complicates the process of key management, raises tasks of securely store keys, keys access control. 
This paper proposes a distributed system model for key management and a protocol of interaction of the 
distributed system modules. The proposed model provides the ability to store keys in a smartphone, and access to 
keys from other devices. The system described in the model consists of 3 modules. The module 1 has computer 
version and smartphone version, and serves to send a request for signing, signature verification, hashing. The module 
2, a smartphone software, provides key pair generation, storing, encrypting and decrypting, archiving keys, 
export/import keys, keys access control, and destroying keys. The module 3, web service, provides communication of 
the first and second modules. 
In addition, the system, which was created based on the current model, provides the ability to use digital 
signatures in web applications. The Module 1 operates as a local web service that accepts requests from a web page 
running in a browser. A special script in a web page sends http requests that include cryptographic operations to the 
specified localhost port and accepts responses. 
 Keywords: key access control, key management, digital signature, hashing, encryption, decryption, QR 
Code, smartphone, web service. 
 
Introduction 
Legal entities and individual entrepreneurs are 
required electronic digital signature for using most of 
the interactive services of state organizations in our 
country. Electronic digital signature is used for identify, 
verify the integrity of electronic documents, etc. Digital 
certificate and private key are provided in an encrypted 
PFX format. Digital signature owners store PFX file in 
flash media and in computer. Practical implementation 
of storing digital certificate and private key in tokens or 
in smart cards are very difficult for the majority of the 
population. Interactive services are offered in the form 
of web services, web applications and / or mobile 
applications. For some interactive services it is 
convenient to use a computer or laptop, and for others a 
smartphone. Thus, it becomes necessary to use the key 
in different devices for different types of applications. 
Considering that the majority owns smartphones, we 
offer a method of storing digital certificates and private 
keys in smartphones, and a model of accessing keys for 
signing and verification signatures from different 
computers, laptops and smartphones. In our model, we 
used a cryptographic module in a smartphone that is 
responsible for key management, a cryptographic 
module in a laptop or a computer that generates a 
signing request and signature verification, as well as an 
intermediate web service to ensure interactions of these 
cryptographic modules. The architecture of the system, 
which provides implementation of the proposed model, 
is shown in figure 1. 
Cryptographic key management encompasses 
the entire lifecycle of cryptographic keys and keys 
materials. Basic key management guidance was 
provided in [1]. A novel Key-Lifecycle Management 
System was presented in [2]. The presented Key-
Lifecycle Management System introduces a pattern-
based method to simplify and to automate the 
deployment task for keys and certificates, also it 
provides a novel form of strict access control to keys 
and realizes the first cryptographically sound and secure 
access-control policy for a key-management interface. 
Developing a cryptographic key management system for 
distributed networks was discussed in [3]. A Time-
based Group Key Management algorithm for 
cryptographic cloud storage applications, which uses the 
proxy re-encryption algorithm to transfer major 
computing task of the group key management to the 
cloud server was proposed in [6]. The algorithm 
described in [6] ensures data confidentiality when 
storing user data in an unreliable cloud using encryption 
and proxy. 
Scholars and management consultants have 
identified platform control as a key feature for business 
success in the ICT industries [10]. 
The introduction of public key cryptography 
was a critical advance in IT security. It enables 
confidential communication between entities in open 
networks, in particular the Internet, without prior 
contact [12]. A Lightweight Public Key Infrastructure 
(LPKI) for the mobile phones was introduced in [7]. It 
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provides robust distributed authentication services. A 
method for distributed E-Business application 
authentication using public key cryptography was 
introduced in [8]. An enhanced secure authentication 
protocol for roaming services on elliptic curve 
cryptography was proposed in [9]. The proposed 
protocol's formal security is verified using Automated 
Validation of Internet Security Protocols and 
Applications tool to certify that the proposed protocol is 
free from security threats. A distributed e-business 
authentication scheme based on conic curve was 
proposed in [11]. A new approach to setting up a secure 
authentication and authorization procedure in a 
distributed computing system without proxy certificates 
was proposed in [13]. 
However, these works do not include a solution 
for the above problem. 
 
App
Client application
Cc
Crypto module in 
computer, notebook, 
smartphone, tablet 
PC,...
Cm
Crypto module in 
smartphone, tablet 
PC,...
W
Web service
http
http
 
Figure 1. The architecture of the system 
 
 
The QR code is used in this system for 
exchanging password between computer and 
smartphone. In the work [4], QR code was analyzed 
from the perspective of their significance and uses. In 
[5] Shettar found QR code as a great technology which 
helped library to cater most crucial user demand for 
access to information through mobile phones. The QR 
code was discussed in [14,15]. The using QR code for 
ensuring security such as authentication, authorization 
was discussed in [19-23]. The implementation of the 
QR code in some areas such as payment system, 
government service, library was provided in [16-18]. 
 
Main part 
We introduce the following notation: 
E – encryption function of public key algorithm 
E’ – encryption function of cipher algorithm  
D –decryption function of public key algorithm 
D’ – decryption function of cipher algorithm  
h(x) – hash function 
M – data to sign 
H – hash value 
Kou – user public key 
Kpu – user private key, private key is saved in encrypted 
form 
Kow– web service public key 
Kpw – web service private key 
Kms and Kcs – symmetric keys 
Cc– crypto module in computer, it has built-in certificate 
of W service 
Cm – crypto module in smartphone for generation, 
export, import, destroying key pairs and signing hash, it 
has built-in certificate of Wc service 
L-login of user in W, L maybe phone number, e-mail 
etc. 
W - Intermediate web service to provide interaction 
between cryptographic modules Cc and Cm. User 
certificates, username and temporary user password are 
stored here.  
Encryption private key of user: 
))(( PINcodehhK  , )('' puKpu KEK   , 
)(KhH k  . 
{K'pu, Kou, HK} - encrypted private key, public key and 
hash value of PIN code. Hash value is used for checking 
the PIN code. 
Decryption private key of user: 
))(( PINcodehhK  , if )(KhH k   then 
)'(' puKpu KDK   
The following processes describe interactions 
between modules step by step. 
 
Registration process 
The registration process is done with modules 
Cm and web service. It includes the following steps: 
Step 1: Cm asks from user to select generation new key 
pairs or import an existing one. 
Step 2: Cm asks user to enter PIN code. 
Step 3: If user selects import an existing key pair go to 
step 7. 
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Step 4: Cm generates new key pairs {Kpu, Kou}. Cm 
encrypts private key, saves  
{ K’pu, Kou, Hk } to storage. 
Step 5: Cm generates Certificate Signing Request (CSR) 
and sends CSR to Registration Authority(RA).  
Step 6: Cm installs certificate obtained from RA, go to 
step 9. 
Step 7: Cm asks user to enter password, and imports key 
pairs encrypted in PFX format.  
Step 8: Cm encrypts Kpu , saves { K’pu, Kou, Hk } and 
certificate to storage. 
Step 9: Cm asks user to enter L, calculates )(LhH  , 
)(' HEH
puK
  and sends {L, H', user certificate} to 
W. 
Step 10: W checks if )()'( LhHD
ouK
  go to step 11, 
else returns "Incorrect parameters". 
Step 11: if L is not used by other user, then go to step 
16. 
Step 12: W checks “Are these certificates belongs to this 
user or not”. For this purpose W selects all of 
certificates attached to L, generates T random number, 
calculates ))((' TEET
oupw KK
 , and returns {T', 
certificates} to Cm. 
Step 13 Cm checks if it has any certificate that is in the 
list of certificates returned by W, then it calculates 
))'(( TDDT
owpu KK
 , ))(('' 1 TEET
owpu
KK
  and 
sends {T'', selected user certificate} to W, go to step 15, 
else go to step 14. In this case 
1
puK  is private key of the 
selected certificate by Cm. 
Step 14: Cm shows to user the message “Login is 
already taken”. Go to step 9. 
Step 15: W checks, if ))''(( 1 TDDT
oupw K
K . 
Step 16: W registers user, saves L and user certificate in 
database, returns “ok” as status of registration, go to 
step 17. 
Step 17: Registration is completed successfully. Cm 
closes the connection with W. 
 
Signature process  
All 3 modules take part in the signature 
process. This process includes the following steps: 
Step 1: App opens connection with Cc for signing. 
Step 2: Cc asks to enter L from user. 
Step 3: Cc generates one time password P and shows it 
to user as QR code. 
Step 4: Cm scans QR code and gets P. Cm checks if user 
has more than one certificates, Cm asks user to select 
one of them, else uses that one. Cm asks user to enter 
PIN code for access to private key. 
Step 5: Cm asks user to enter PIN code for access to 
private key. Cm  calculates ))(( PINcodehhK  , if 
)(KhH k   then )'(' puKpu KDK  , else shows 
“PIN code is incorrect” message and go to step 5. 
Step 6: Cm calculates )(' PhH m  , 
)'(' mK HES pu . Cm generates Kms, calculates 
)('' PEP
msKm
 , ))((' msKKms KEEK owpu .  
Step 7: Cm sends L and user selected certificate to W. 
Step 8: W generates random number T, calculates 
))((' TEET
oupw KK
 , and returns T' to Cm. 
Step 9: Cm calculates ))'(( TDDT
owpu KK
 , 
))(('' TEET
owpu KK
  and Cm sends {L, T'', P'm, K'ms, 
S'} to W. 
Step 10: W checks if ))''(( TDDT
oupw KK
  then 
calculates ))'(( msKKms KDDK oupw , 
)'(' mK PDP ms , )'(SDH ouK  and checks if 
)(PhH   than W sets temporary password P for L. 
Step 11: Cc generates Kcs, calculates )('' PEP
csKc
 , 
)('' csKcs KEK ow . Cc and sends {L, K'cs, P'c} to W 
for authentication. 
Step 12: W calculates )'( csKcs KDK pw , 
)'(' cK PDP cs  and checks, if L and P is right W 
returns to Cc the user certificate else returns to Cc 
“Login or pass is incorrect”. 
Step 13: If Cc gets message “Login or pass is incorrect” 
from W, then Cc shows message to user and go to Step 
2. 
Step 14: Cc returns to App the user certificate.  
Step 15: App sends to Cc the user certificate and M for 
hashing.  
Step 16: Cc calculates )(MhH   and returns it to 
App, the hash algorithm determined by the certificate 
for signing. 
Step 17: App sends H to Cc for sign. 
Step 18: Cc calculates )('' HEH
csKc
  and sends H'c 
to W. 
Step 19: W calculates )'(' cK HDH cs , 
)('' HEH
msKm
 . 
Step 20: Cm gets H'm and the selected user certificate 
from W. 
Step 21: Cm calculates )'(' mK HDH ms . Cm asks 
user to allow signing H.  
Step 22: If user allows signing then Cm calculates 
)(HES
puK
 , )('' SES
msK
 , sends S' and “ok” as 
status of the signing else sends “sign not allowed” as 
status of the signing to W. 
Step 23: Cc gets status and S from W. 
Step 24: Cc returns to App the status and S.  
Step 25: App checks, if status is ok App uses S as 
signature.  
Step 26: App closes connection with Cc. 
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Step 27: Cc closes connection with W. 
Step 28: W deletes P. 
 
Signature verification 
Signature verification process includes the 
following steps: 
Step 1: App opens connection with Cc for verify 
signature. 
Step 2: App sends to Cc the user certificate and M for 
hashing. 
Step 3: Cc calculates )(MhH   and returns H to App. 
hash algorithm determined by the user certificate. 
Step 4: App sends H, S and the user certificate to Cc. 
Step 5: Cc checks, If )(SDH
ouK
  then Cc returns 
“signature is valid” as status of verification, else returns 
“signature is not valid” as status of verification.  
Step 6: App closes the connection with Cc. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we provided a description of the 
distributed system model for key management and a 
protocol of interaction of the distributed system 
modules. We presented the registration process of the 
user, signature process, signature verification process 
step by step. The user registration process includes key 
pair generation and/or import existing key pairs, 
generating and sending CSR to obtain digital certificate 
from RA, and registration user digital certificate in Web 
service. Signature process includes temporary password 
generation, generating QR code of the password, 
scanning QR code by Cm , setting temporary password 
for session, generating and sending request for sign 
hash, sign hash, as well as secure data exchange 
between modules using encryption with cipher 
algorithm and public key algorithm. Signature 
verification process includes computing hash value and 
signature verification. As a digital signature algorithm 
[24], must be chosen one that supports encryption with 
public key, because key pair of the user digital 
certificate are used for secure key exchange, for data 
integrity and identification in this system. RSA and 
DSA, Steps presented above are enough to provide 
signature and signature verification using key pair in 
smartphone. The distributed system, presented in this 
paper, can be used for providing the ability to store keys 
in a smartphone, and accessing to keys from other 
devices. 
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